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ABSTRACT
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) use different methods and structures for base erosion and profit
shifting (BEPS) to optimize the tax liability of the group. It is of great interest to the relevant countries to
be able to identify such practices and react with appropriate measures. The objective of this paper is to
verify whether selected MNEs engaged in the digital economy tend to shift profits from the Czech
Republic to jurisdictions with lower taxation using the tax evasion rate (TER) indicator and the
transactional net margin method (TNNM). Since the TER method has not been tested yet, this paper also
aims to demonstrate its application on real world data and to evaluate its usability. On a sample of five
MNEs, the analysis showed a potential tendency to shift profits within Europe for four MNEs (Amazon,
Apple, Google and Uber) and a potential tendency to shift profits specifically from the Czech Republic
for one MNE (Amazon). The analysis shows that TER is suitable as a preliminary indication of possible
risks, rather than their exact quantification.
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Due to the elimination of economic barriers along with the digitalization of the economy, it has
become easier for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to shift taxable profits from one jurisdiction
to another than it was in the past. One of the reasons is that businesses are no longer dependent
on physical places (offices, factories, stores, etc.). Taxation, on the contrary, relies on the physical
presence of businesses to a great extent. MNEs also have great resources at their disposal
allowing them to seek optimal tax solutions by exploiting numerous double tax treaties and the
differences between the tax systems of jurisdictions where they operate. This phenomenon is
called base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS).
According to Buckley (1985), an MNE can be defined simply as an entity that “owns outputs
of goods and services originating in more than one country”. Entities may also be labeled as
MNEs based on other criteria, e.g., by examining the international ownership structure of related
entities, the number of foreign subsidiaries, etc.
MNEs are significant for the economy and the industry of the countries where they operate.
Considering their size, MNEs also represent a significant source of tax revenues. Thus, countries
are motivated to enter into tax competition with other countries or to offer preferential tax
regimes to MNEs (Hines 2014). Even though an MNEs decision regarding which countries it
operates in is not made solely based on tax preferences, it is well known that effective taxation is
one of the criteria that play an important role when determining how and where to set up an
international business (Tanzi 1996).
Despite intensive international efforts to hinder tax avoidance (projects such as BEPS Action
Plan, or the European Union’s Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, ATAD), a significant corporate
income tax (CIT) gap still exists. In 2014, the CIT gap from BEPS ranged from 4 to 10% of
global CIT revenue (OECD 2015). Even though recent findings indicate that on average, tax
avoidance in the EU may be decreasing over time (Thomsen – Watrin 2018; Murphy 2019), to
close the CIT gap, countries need to learn which MNEs engage in BEPS as well as where and
how the taxable profit is shifted.
This paper aims to identify the tendency of selected MNEs operating in the digital economy
to shift profits from the Czech Republic with the intention of optimizing their global tax liability
using a special indicator, the tax evasion rate (TER), proposed by Brada and Buus (2009). Since
the method has not been tested on real world data yet, it is also the aim of this paper to
demonstrate its potential as well as its limits. We supplement the TER method with a traditional
benchmarking analysis using the OECDs transactional net margin method (TNNM).
Within social sciences, it has proven useful to use case studies when demonstrating that
newly proposed and so far untested methods warrant further testing (Christians 2010). That is
why we approach the problem with a set of case studies. Therefore, our results cannot provide
general conclusions about profit shifting tendencies of all MNEs. The analysis and its results are
nevertheless valuable for the critical assessment of the new method that can be discussed and
used for further research.
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European branches of selected MNEs – Amazon, Apple, Avast, Google and Uber – have been
used for the case studies. Data used is obtained from the Amadeus database and processed in R
software. Potentially risky members of selected MNEs in the Czech Republic are identified and
the setup of these members’ transfer prices is assessed.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
One should distinguish between tax planning, aggressive tax planning and tax evasion, even
though the borderlines are often difficult to determine (e.g., Oats – Tuck 2019; Fuest – Riedel
2009). Tax planning is the form of tax optimization intended by the legislators. Aggressive tax
planning is usually regarded as tax avoidance, which broadly speaking means playing by the
rules given by law in a way that was not intended by the legislators. Direct violation of the rules
given by law is regarded as tax evasion. It can be quite challenging to recognize aggressive tax
planning, as vague terms like “fair share of tax” or “ethical aspects” are involved in the dis-
cussion (Datt 2014). Furthermore, due to the ambiguous definition and unintended nature of
aggressive tax planning, it is even more challenging to estimate its extent. Still, there are studies
that provide such estimates. According to Hines (2014), MNEs reallocate approximately two per
cent of their taxable profits from high to low-tax jurisdictions using aggressive tax planning.
According to UNCTAD (2015b), approximately 30% of cross-border investment is directed
through so called “conduit countries” before reaching the intended destination, which also
points to the use of aggressive tax planning structures. Bradbury et al. (2018) provide several
estimates of the extent of BEPS between 2012 and 2015 ranging from USD 80bn to 647bn.
Cobham and Jansky (2019) conclude that in 2012, as much as USD 660bn of taxable profit was
shifted using aggressive tax planning structures; this corresponds to about 0.9% of world GDP.
Different approaches are used to identify and quantify aggressive tax planning. Broadly
speaking, the approaches can be divided into two groups – macroeconomic approaches and
microeconomic approaches. Studies using macroeconomic approaches often identify BEPS
indirectly through foreign direct investments recorded in the balance of payments of countries.
The relationship between foreign direct investments, the specifics of national tax systems and
aggressive tax planning was researched for example by Castillo-Murciego and Lopez-Laborda
(2019), UNCTAD (2015a), the International Monetary Fund (2014) and Hajkova et al. (2006).
In contrast, studies using microeconomic approaches rely on firm-level data (e.g., Fuest – Riedel
2012; Davies et al. 2015; Nerudova et al. 2020a and Vicard 2015).
Studies also focus on different strategies used by entities engaged in aggressive tax planning
(Fuest – Riedel 2012) as well as the different channels used to shift profits. Such channels include
debt financing (e.g., Huizinga et al. 2008; Buettner – Wamser 2013), royalty fee payments (e.g.,
Fuest et al. 2013; Evers – Spengel 2014) and transfer pricing (e.g., Davies et al. 2015; Vicard
2015).
Out of these channels, transfer pricing is a central focus of the current discussions about
aggressive tax planning. The fact that 4 out of 15 actions proposed by the BEPS report (OECD
2016) are directly focused on transfer pricing highlights the need to develop new methods to
better identify and quantify BEPS via transfer pricing, especially at the microeconomic level, to
help tax authorities prevent such behavior. Our paper contributes to this discussion by testing a
so far untested method (TER) proposed by Brada and Buus (2009, 2010) based on firm-level
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data over a series of case studies. By focusing our studies on the Czech Republic, we add to the
existing literature covering profit shifting from the Czech Republic (e.g., Jansky – Kokes 2015,
2016). In a broader sense however, our approach may be applicable to other post-communist
countries as well, especially the other members of the Visegrad Four (cf. Nerudova et al. 2020b)
due to a high degree of similarity between their economies and their geopolitical closeness to the
Czech Republic.
3. DATA
Five MNEs are chosen for our case studies based on several criteria ensuring their viability as
research subjects; i.e., (i) the MNEs play a significant role in the digital economy, (ii) the MNEs
have European branches – i.e., the MNEs operate in Europe, (iii) the MNEs also have members
in the Czech Republic – i.e., the MNEs operate in the Czech Republic, (iv) for practical reasons,
the European branches of the MNEs have no more than 150 members and a relatively simple
ownership structure.
Not many MNEs fulfill all the criteria simultaneously. For example, Netflix operates in the
Czech Republic; however, it has no Czech members. Another example is Sony, which has a
Czech member, but its ownership structure is complex and its European branch has over 200
members. After careful consideration, Amazon, Apple, Avast, Google and Uber were chosen for
our case studies since they fulfill all the criteria while also form a balanced group including larger
and smaller MNEs as well as established and recently established MNEs alike.
Amazon is a technological giant best known for its online trading platform Amazon.com. It
was founded in 1994 and is headquartered in Seattle, Washington. In FY 2019, Amazon’s global
revenues reached $280,522m and it employed around 840,000 workers (as per the published FY
2019 annual report). Apple is another technology giant best known for its iPhone, iPad and Mac
product lines. However, in recent years, the importance of its services (e.g., App Store, Apple
Music, etc.) has been growing rapidly. Apple was founded in 1976 in Cupertino, California,
where its current seat is also located. In 2019, Apple’s global revenues reached $260,176m and it
employed around 137,000 workers (as per the published FY 2019 annual report). Avast is a
Czech MNE focusing on cyber-security. It was founded in 1988 and has its headquarters in
Prague. Interestingly, it did not have its initial public offering (IPO) until May 2018, up until
which point it was owned privately. In 2019, Avast’s global revenues reached $871 m and it
employed around 1,700 workers (as per the published FY 2019 annual report). Google originally
built its online empire around its signature search engine, but has since diversified into many
other technological areas. Google was founded in 1998 and is headquartered in Mountain View,
California. In 2019, Google’s global revenues reached $161,857m and it employed 118,899
workers (as per the published FY 2019 annual report). Uber is a shared-economy startup whose
app has evolved from a ridesharing solution into a digital platform competing with traditional
taxi services. It was founded in 2009 and has its headquarters in San Francisco, California. In
2019, Uber’s global revenues reached $14,147m and it employed approximately 26,900 workers
(as per the published FY 2019 annual report).
With the selection of MNEs concluded, we move on to obtaining data for our analysis. An
initial sample containing financial information of all members of European branches of the
chosen MNEs for FY 2015–2017 is obtained from the Amadeus database (data provided by
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Bureau van Dijk). We then reduce the initial sample to a final sample via an elimination process
described below and summarized in Table 1.
Firstly, we exclude any members with incomplete or missing data on profit/loss (P/L) before
tax, the amount of tax paid and P/L after tax for two or more FYs; the remaining financial data is
averaged between the FYs. Next, ownership structures are identified in the sample and a con-
trolling entity is found for each MNE where the ownership structure of the majority of the
sample converges. A controlling entity can be either “local” (a European entity in the sample) or
“global” (a non-European entity outside the sample). Members not belonging to the ownership
structure – i.e., members with no relation to the controlling entity – are eliminated from the
sample. This includes members belonging to a different branch of the same MNEs ownership
structure. Finally, members below the materiality threshold (average after-tax P/L below EUR
500K) and members with anomalous tax rates (e.g., thousands of percent) are excluded. The
final sample is described in Table 2.
From the final sample, two datasets are constructed for each MNE:
D is a dataset containing information on average P/L before tax, average amount of tax paid
and average P/L after tax of each member of the MNE.
M is a dataset containing the ownership structure of the MNE (see below).
Additional financial data on independent comparables of selected Czech members of the
chosen MNEs for FY 2015–2017 is also obtained from the Amadeus database for benchmarking
purposes on an ad-hoc basis, as required for our case studies.
4. METHODOLOGY
For selected MNEs, we first calculate the TER indicator proposed by Brada and Buus (2009,
2010) by simulating optimal distribution of profits within MNEs and comparing it to real world
data. We use a modified version of the indicator allowing us to overcome some of the original’s
limitations such as the inability to deal with negative tax losses and the fact that it results in
corner solutions by assuming no limit to MNEs profit shifting ability. We achieve this by
Table 1. Data acquisition and elimination process
Data acquisition and elimination process Amazon Apple Avast Google Uber
Initial sample before elimination 114 29 15 61 36
Eliminated from sample 76 11 9 40 15
- Members with incomplete financial data 54 8 8 16 11
- Members of different branches 14 1 0 3 0
- Members below materiality threshold 7 2 0 21 4
- Members with anomalous tax rate 1 0 1 0 0
Final sample after elimination 38 18 6 21 21
Source: Authors, based on data from the Amadeus database (by Bureau van Dijk).
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formulating several simple rules governing the MNEs profit shifting behavior when solving the
optimization. We then use two additional TER-based indicators ðTOL; TOPÞ to help identify
profit shifting tendencies of individual members of the MNEs located in the Czech Republic.
To supplement the results, we follow up with an individual analysis of the transfer pricing
setup of the Czech members using the OECDs TNNM and contrast our findings with the results
provided by TER.
4.1. Tax Evasion Rate (TER) method
Brada and Buus (2009) use a simple mathematical model based on advanced linear algebra to
describe how MNEs shift profits between countries with different levels of taxation to optimize
their global after-tax profit using transfer pricing as the profit shifting channel. To quantify the
tendency of MNEs to shift profits, Brada and Buus propose using an indicator, the TER obtained
as a result of a series of optimization tasks of the MNEs behavior.
In their follow-up work, Brada and Buus (2010) also suggest that the specific places where
profit shifting occurs within an MNE may be identified by examining the minimum and
maximum solutions of the mathematical model and contrasting them to the real world distri-
bution of profits within the MNE.
For our case studies, we use a modified version of the mathematical model proposed by
Brada and Buus (2009) with the following basic objects:
n is a scalar equal to the number of members of an MNE in the final sample.
M is an n x n matrix; M 5 (mi,k) describing the ownership structure of an MNE in the final
sample (“share matrix”); data is obtained from datasetM. Element mi,k ofM denotes the share
of member i in member k; mi;k ∈ 0; 1. If the MNE has a local controlling entity, it is described
by the first line ofM. Diagonal valuesmi,k denote free shares not described by the share matrix,
i.e., shares held by entities outside the share matrix. The free shares can be held either by a
global controlling entity – as is the case in our case studies – or by other unrelated parties.
Table 2. Final sample of selected MNEs
Final sample of















APPLE INC. n.a. Google LLC. UBER
INTERNATIONAL
C.V.
Members 38 18 6 21 21
Countries CZ, DE, FR, GB,
IE, IT, LU, PL, SK
BE, DE, DK, ES, FI,




AT, BE, CZ, DK, ES,
FR, GB, IE, NL, PL,
RU, SE, UA
BE, CZ, DK, ES, FI,
FR, GB, HR, IE, IT,
NL, NO, PL, PT, RO,
RU, SE, UA
Source: Authors, based on data from the Amadeus database (by Bureau van Dijk).
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v is a column vector denoting the free shares held by the global controlling entity in the
members of the MNE (as described by M). In our case studies, all free shares – where
applicable – are held by the global controlling entity; i.e., v ¼ 1.
E is an n x n unit matrix used for calculation purposes; E 5 (ei,k); ek,k 5 1.
l is a column vector used for summation purposes; l ¼ 1.
t is a column vector denoting the corporate income tax rate (tk) of member k of an MNE;
tk ∈ h0; 1i; data is obtained from the appropriate column of dataset D. For the sake of
simplicity, it is assumed that only one tax rate exists (i.e., there are no differentiated tax
rates, withholding tax rates or preferential tax treatment); tk is calculated as the average tax
paid by member k divided by the member’s P/L before tax.
W is an n x n matrix with vector t on its diagonal used for calculation purposes; W 5 (wi,k);
wk,k 5 tk.
z is a column vector where element zk denotes the corporate income tax base of member k of
an MNE that is observed in reality; data is obtained from the appropriate column of dataset
D. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that the corporate income tax base is equal to
P/L before tax (i.e., there are no adjustments to P/L before tax, no accruals, etc.).
We also define the following functions and additional objects:
x is a column vector of variables, where xk denotes the potential corporate income tax
base of member k after profit shifting took place. This vector serves as an input
variable for all subsequent functions and optimization tasks.
f taxðxÞ is a function which returns total tax paid by an MNE given the distribution of tax
bases x; ftaxðxÞ ¼ vTMWx.
f profitðxÞ is a function which returns total P/L after tax of an MNE given the distribution of
tax bases x; fprofitðxÞ ¼ vTMðE −WÞx.
f conðxÞ is a constraint function which returns the sum of all elements in x; fconðxÞ ¼ xTl.
ttax is a scalar equal to the total tax paid by an MNE observed in the real world; data is
obtained from the appropriate column of dataset D. Alternatively, it can be denoted
as ttax ¼ ftaxðzÞ ¼ vTMWz.
tnet is a scalar equal to total P/L after tax of MNE observed in the real world; data is
obtained from the appropriate column of dataset D. Alternatively, it can be denoted
as tnet ¼ fprofitðzÞ ¼ vTMðE −WÞz.
tgross is a scalar equal to total P/L before tax of MNE observed in the real world; data is
obtained from the appropriate column of dataset D. Alternatively, it can be denoted
as tgross ¼ lTMz.
The model allows us to find the distribution of tax liability and net profit (P/L after tax)
between individual members of an MNE for any distribution of tax bases x. It can also be used to
determine such x where the MNE achieves the lowest and/or highest possible net profit by







With respect to constraints:
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xmax is a column vector denoting such distribution of tax bases after profit shifting which
maximizes the MNEs total net profit under the given constraints. However, since solnp
package can only be used to find a minimum solution, the task is reformulated to
finding a solution that minimizes the MNEs total tax (instead of maximizing its total net





xmin is a column vector denoting such distribution of tax bases after profit shifting which




lb is a column vector representing the lower boundary of tax bases x required by the solnp
package to solve the optimization tasks.
ub is a column vector representing the upper boundary of tax bases x required by the solnp
package to solve the optimization tasks.
For the sake of simplicity, Brada and Buus (2010) do not allow members of MNEs to have
negative tax bases (or negative tax paid) and assume that there is no limit to an MNEs capacity
to shift profits. These assumptions could be denoted as lb ¼ 0 and ub ¼ tgross. With upper and
lower boundaries set this way, the whole profit of an MNE could be shifted to the member with
the highest/lowest taxation resulting in corner solutions of the optimization tasks.
Corner solutions, however, do not usually reflect the economic reality of profit shifting.
Furthermore, we have encountered multiple entities in the final sample exhibiting negative tax
bases and/or negative tax. To better reflect the economic reality of profit shifting and to avoid
unsubstantiated exclusion of members exhibiting tax losses from the final sample, we set the
upper and lower boundaries in the following way:
a) Let us denote a constant shift ¼ a3tgross; a∈ ð0; 1>; tgross>0; where a is a coefficient
quantifying the capacity of an MNE to shift profits. Constant shift represents the part of
MNEs total tax base that can be shifted to a single member from other members and vice
versa.
Note: MNEs cannot usually shift their total tax base due to various transactional barriers (e.g.,
transfer pricing regulations, the risk of tax audits, etc.) and other economic factors. In our
model, MNEs are only allowed to shift profit by the amount of “shift”.
b) For member k of an MNE: if zk ≥ 0 and at the same time tk ≥ 0, the boundaries are set to lbk
5 max (0; zk  shift); ubk 5 zk þ shift.
Note: If both the tax base and the tax rate observed in reality are positive, it is undesirable for
MNEs to shift profits away from member k in a way that would create a tax loss since this
could potentially alarm the tax authorities. When decreasing the tax base of member k, the
MNE is therefore limited by zero and its capacity to shift profits. When increasing the tax base
of member k, the MNE is limited only by its capacity to shift profits.
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c) For member k of an MNE: if zk ≥ 0 and at the same time tk ≥ 0, the boundaries are set to lbk
5 max (0; zk  shift); ubk 5 zk.
Note: If the tax base is positive and the tax rate is negative, it is undesirable for MNEs to create
a tax loss in member k for the same reasons as described in b). When decreasing the tax base of
member k, the MNE is therefore limited by zero and its capacity to shift profits. Increasing the
tax base would ad absurdum lead to a lower tax liability; when increasing the tax base, the
MNE is therefore limited by the tax base observed in reality. The same applies to 0% tax rates.
d) For member k of an MNE: if zk < 0 and at the same time tk ≥ 0, the boundaries are set to lbk
5 zk; ubk 5 zk þ shift.
Note: If the tax base is negative (i.e., the member has a tax loss) and the tax rate is positive, it is
undesirable for MNEs to create additional tax loss in member k for the same reasons as
described in situation b). When decreasing the tax base of member k, the MNE is therefore
limited by the tax loss observed in reality. When increasing the tax base of member k, the MNE
is limited only by its capacity to shift profits.
e) For member k of an MNE: if zk ≤ 0 and at the same time tk ≤ 0, the boundaries are set to:
lbk ¼ zk; ubk ¼ minð0; zk þ shiftÞ.
Note: If the tax base is negative (i.e., the member has a tax loss) and the tax rate is also
negative, it is undesirable for MNEs to create additional tax loss in member k for the same
reasons as described in situation b). When decreasing the tax base of member k, the MNE is
therefore limited by the tax loss observed in reality. Increasing the tax base above zero would
ad absurdum lead to a lower tax liability; when increasing the tax base of member k, the MNE
is therefore limited by zero as well as its capacity to shift profits. The same applies to 0% tax
rates.
We stress that even the above-mentioned rules represent a substantial simplification of the
economic reality of profit shifting. We therefore recommend further research of MNEs profit
shifting behavior that would result in a more comprehensive ruleset.
Finally, the TER as well as two other vector indicators can be constructed from the results of
the optimization tasks:
TER ¼ tnet  fprofitðxminÞ
fprofitðxmaxÞ  fprofitðxminÞ; TER∈ h0; 1i
TOL ¼ xmin  xmax
TOP ¼ xmin  z
where:
TER is the “Tax Evasion Rate”, an indicator that quantifies the degree of similarity between
an MNEs net profit observed in reality and the maximum net profit achievable by an
MNE by profit shifting (with the minimum achievable net profit used as a zero point).
This indicator can be interpreted as the perceived tendency of an MNE to shift its global
profits to members with lower taxation using transfer pricing.
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TOL from “Tax Optimization Leeway” is an indicator that quantifies the gap between the tax
bases minimizing the net profit ðxminÞ of an MNE and the tax bases maximizing its net
profit ðxmaxÞ. TOL can be used to pinpoint specific members of the MNE where profit
shifting could occur (“risky members”). For risky member r of the MNE: TOLr  0.
TOP from “Tax Optimum Proximity” is an indicator that quantifies the proximity of the
actual distribution of tax bases of an MNE observed in reality to the distribution of tax
bases maximizing its net profit (or in other words the distance of the actual distribution
z from the distribution minimizing the MNEs net profit xmin). Similarly to TOL; TOP
can be used to pinpoint specific members of the MNE where profit shifting could occur
(risky members). For risky member r of the MNE: TOPr  0.
4.2. Transactional Net Margin Method (TNNM)
A more traditional approach to assessing whether an MNE engages in profit shifting requires
examining its transfer pricing setup using one of OECDs traditional methods (the comparable
uncontrolled price method, the cost plus method, the resale price method) or transactional
profit methods (the transactional net margin method, the transactional profit split method). The
OECDs approach involves performing a benchmarking analysis to find arm’s length prices that
would be charged in transactions between unrelated parties and contrasting these prices with the
prices charged by MNEs on intragroup transactions (OECD 2017).
We chose the TNNM to supplement the results of the TER method by analyzing the
transfer pricing setup of Czech members of MNEs (analyzed members). While most of the
OECDs methods rely on non-public information about the operations of MNEs (e.g., pricing
policies and detailed accounting data), TNNM may be applied using only publicly available
data.
Rather than benchmarking the prices of individual transactions, TNNM benchmarks a
suitable profit level indicator of comparable independent entities (comparables). We chose
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) margin as our profit level indicator as it has a
reasonable predictive power for our case studies and the data needed for its calculation is readily
available: EBITmargin ¼ EBIT=total revenues; EBITmargin∈ h0; 1i:
We select the initial sample of comparables using a search strategy consisting of multiple
fixed and variable criteria. Fixed criteria (i.e., criteria common for all analyzed members) are: (i)
EU28 region, (ii) BvD Independence indicator A-, A or Aþ, and (iii) financial data available for
FY 2015–2017. Variable criteria (i.e., criteria varying between analyzed members) are (i) relevant
NACE code, (ii) total revenues between approximately 0.25–4 times that of the analyzed
member, and (iii) total assets between approximately 0.25–4 times that of the analyzed member.
We then exclude entities with missing data on EBIT and total revenues from the initial
sample. We also exclude entities with losses in two or more FYs – a common step to ensure
comparability (Solilova – Nerudova 2019). The remaining financial data is averaged between the
FYs. Next, we exclude any entities engaging in substantially different activities than the analyzed
member (such entities are often present in the sample despite the initially applied NACE
criteria). Entities with unavailable or unreachable websites are automatically eliminated. Finally,
we increase the comparability of the sample by eliminating extreme values – i.e., entities with
EBIT margins outside the interquartile range – as recommended by Feinschreiber (2004). The
remaining comparables represent the arm’s length range of EBIT margin.
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4.3. Our approach
To test whether the chosen MNEs shift profits from the Czech Republic to countries with lower
taxation and to test the TER method on real world data, we have devised the following approach
to our case studies combining the TER method with TNNM:
a) First, TER of chosen MNEs is calculated.
- If TER∈ h0; 5; 1i, it is assumed that the tendency of the MNE to shift its global profits
may be significant, and the MNE is therefore subject to further analysis aimed at deter-
mining whether the global tendency manifests itself in the Czech Republic.
- If TER∈<0; 0; 5Þ, it is assumed that the tendency of the MNE to shift its global profits is
not significant enough for further analysis.
b) Where TER∈ 0; 5; 1; TOL andTOP are calculated to determine whether an MNEs Czech
member is a risky member potentially shifting profits from the Czech Republic.
- If for member r: TOLr  0 and at the same time TOPr  0, it is suspected that member r
is the MNEs risky member and it is subject to further analysis to confirm the initial
suspicion.
- Otherwise, member r does not arise suspicion of being the MNEs risky member. It is
therefore determined that the MNEs global profit shifting tendency does not manifest itself
in the Czech Republic.
c) Risky Czech members of MNEs which arise suspicion are subject to benchmarking analysis
using TNNM to assess whether the risky member’s transfer pricing setup complies with the
arm’s length principle.
- If for member r the EBIT margin falls outside the interquartile (arm’s length) range, it is
assumed that the suspicion regarding the risky member r has been confirmed and that the
MNE has a tendency to shift profits from the Czech Republic.
- Otherwise, it is assumed that the suspicion regarding the risky member r has not been
confirmed. It is therefore determined that the MNEs global profit shifting tendency does
not manifest itself in the Czech Republic.
5. RESULTS
In the first step, we calculate TER for all chosen MNEs. Because a cannot be easily observed in
reality and/or accurately estimated from real world data, we calculate TER five times for
a∈ f0; 2; 0; 4; 0; 6; 0; 8; 1g with the following results (Table 3).
We stress that TER values should not be interpreted as an exact and final quantification of an
MNEs profit shifting tendencies/risk, but rather as an indication that such risks may exist (i.e., that
the MNE may be motivated to shift profits). For example assuming that Amazon has the capacity
to shift 40% of its total profit (a 5 0.4), then the observed distribution of net profit between
Amazon’s members corresponds to the ideal distribution (i.e., the distribution maximizing Am-
azon’s total net profit and minimizing total tax) from 68% (TER 5 0.68). This information is,
however, insufficient to draw conclusions about whether Amazon engages in profit shifting or not.
TER should always be interpreted with the broad economic reality in mind and should be sup-
ported by other methods. Below, we interpret the average TER values listed in Table 3.
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Avast exhibits by far the lowest TER (0.29), and therefore the lowest global tendency to shift
profits. The low tendency may be attributed – for example – to: (i) the relatively small size of
Avast compared to the other MNEs (Avast has only 6 members in CZ, UK, and RS), which may
prevent extensive profit shifting; (ii) the relatively low revenues of Avast compared to other
MNEs potentially rendering complicated and expensive profit shifting structures unfeasible; (iii)
the fact that Avast was owned privately by Czech owners until May 2018 which may have
resulted in a decreased motivation to shift profits from the Czech Republic; and (iv) the fact that
Avast’s services are not very diversified, limiting the number of profit shifting channels. The lack
of profit shifting is also evidenced by the fact that the majority of Avast’s total net profit is
achieved by one of its Czech members despite this member exhibiting the highest tax rate (i.e.,
Avast’s profit is being accumulated in the Czech Republic despite higher taxation).
Uber exhibits the second lowest TER (0.55) which slightly exceeds the chosen cut-off value
(0.5), making Uber subject to further analysis. We point out that Uber’s global profit shifting
tendency is higher than Avast’s but still significantly lower than that of the other MNEs (i.e.,
medium). This may be attributed – for example – to: (i) the relatively low revenues of Uber
compared to other MNEs (except for Avast), making complicated and expensive profit shifting
structure potentially unfeasible; (ii) the fact that Uber was owned privately until May 2019; and
(iii) the fact that compared to Avast, Uber’s revenues are an order of magnitude higher which
could explain the higher global profit shifting tendency.
Amazon exhibits higher TER than previous MNEs (0.68) making it subject to further
analysis. The increase in TER over Avast and Uber could be attributed – for example – to: (i) the
absence of certain limitations present in Avast and (to a lower extent) Uber; and (ii) the fact that
Amazon is a publicly traded company motivated to increase shareholder value. We note that
Amazon’s global profit shifting tendency is still considerably lower than Apple’s and Google’s
(which are similar in size to Amazon); we therefore denote it as medium.
Apple exhibits the second highest TER (0.81) which indicates a high global profit shifting
tendency. This would make Apple subject to further analysis; however, Apple’s Czech member was
eliminated from the final sample because it falls below the materiality threshold (i.e., its net profit
is below EUR 500K). Furthermore, the Czech member engages in R&D activities subsidized by the
Czech government, resulting in a negative tax liability as well as a negative tax rate of
Table 3. Tax Evasion Rate (TER) of selected MNEs
TER calculation Amazon Apple Avast Google Uber
TER value for a 5 0.2 0.62 0.73 0.42 0.85 0.56
TER value for a 5 0.4 0.68 0.78 0.31 0.90 0.55
TER value for a 5 0.6 0.70 0.82 0.25 0.92 0.54
TER value for a 5 0.8 0.71 0.85 0.22 0.93 0.54
TER value for a 5 1.0 0.71 0.87 0.23 0.93 0.54
Average TER value 0.68 0.81 0.29 0.91 0.55
Source: Authors, based on data from the Amadeus database (by Bureau van Dijk).
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approximately -15%; this would suggest that Apple is motivated to shift profits to the Czech
Republic from other countries (to benefit from the subsidy) rather than the other way around.
Thus, it seems improbable that Apple is shifting profits from the Czech Republic via the Czech
member.
Google exhibits the highest TER (0.91) which indicates high global profit shifting tendencies
and makes Google subject to further analysis. Similarly to Apple and Amazon, this tendency
might be explained – for example – by: (i) the absence of economic and other limitations
preventing profit shifting; and (ii) the fact that it is a publicly traded company (see above for
Table 4. Tax Optimization Leeway (TOL) and Tax Optimum Proximity (TOP) of selected MNEs
TOL, TOP calculation Amazon CZ Google CZ Uber CZ
TOL and TOP values for a 5 0.2
TOL value 35,417 0 10,678
TOP value 31,246 -797 10,621
TOL >> 0 and TOP >> 0 yes no yes
TOL and TOP values for a 5 0.4
TOL value 66,663 0 10,678
TOP value 62,492 -797 10,621
TOL >> 0 and TOP >> 0 yes no yes
TOL and TOP values for a  0.6
TOL value 87,799 0 10,678
TOP value 83,628 -797 10,621
TOL >> 0 and TOP >> 0 yes no yes
TOL and TOP values for a 5 0.8
TOL value 10,770 0 10,678
TOP value 6,599 -797 10,621
TOL >> 0 and TOP >> 0 yes no yes
TOL and TOP values for a 5 1.0
TOL value 0 0 0
TOP value -4,171 -797 -57
TOL >> 0 and TOP >> 0 no no no
Summary
Number of positive results 4 0 4
Suspicion about profit shifting yes no yes
Source: Authors, based on data from the Amadeus database (by Bureau van Dijk); TOL and TOP values are listed
in thousands of EUR.
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more details). Additionally, a certain tendency to shift profits from the Czech Republic may be
indicated by the Czech member’s high tax rate (almost 37%).
Based on our TER calculation, we assume that 4 out of the 5 chosen MNEs (Amazon, Apple,
Google and Uber) may have significant tendencies to shift their global profits. These results are
generally in line with our expectations based on several recent high-profile cases covered by the
media.
The global profit shifting tendency might be stronger in Amazon, Apple and Google than in
Uber, whose average TER is close to the cut-off value (0.5). Avast’s global profit shifting ten-
dency is not significant enough for further analysis. Each of the remaining MNEs has exactly one
Czech member in the final sample (except for Apple which is not subject to further analysis as
explained above): Amazon Logistic Prague s.r.o. (Amazon CZ), Google Czech Republic s.r.o.
(Google CZ) and Uber Czech Republic Technology s.r.o. (Uber CZ).
In the second step, we calculate Tax Optimization Leeway (TOL) and Tax Optimum
Proximity (TOP) values for the Czech members of the remaining MNEs. Similarly to TER, TOL
and TOP were calculated 5 times for a∈ f0; 2; 0; 4; 0; 6; 0; 8; 1g. Only members where r ex-
hibits TOLr  0 and TOPr  0 for the majority of a tested (i.e., at least 3 positive results out of
5) are considered to be risky members. The results are shown in Table 4.
Based on our TOL and TOP calculation, Amazon CZ and Uber CZ are suspected to be risky
Czech members of Amazon and Uber respectively that may be used to shift profits from the
Czech Republic. The risky members are subject to further analysis. On the other hand, Google
CZ does not arise suspicion and is probably not used to shift profits from the Czech Republic
despite the fact that TER implies a high global profit shifting tendency.
In the third step, we perform a benchmarking analysis of the risky members using TNNM.
The variable criteria for Amazon CZ are: (i) NACE codes 521, 5,224, 5,229; (ii) total revenues
between EUR 37.5m–600m; and (iii) total assets between EUR 20m–320m. The variable criteria
for Uber CZ are (i) NACE code 4,932; (ii) total revenues between EUR 125K-2m; and (iii) total
assets between EUR 31K–500K. The final sample contains five comparables for each risky
member. The results of the benchmark are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5. Transactional Net Margin Method (TNNM) benchmark of risky members
TNNM benchmark Amazon CZ Uber CZ
EBIT margin of the risky member 2.82% 7.91%
Interquartile range 3.44–4.85% 3.80–12.21%
Minimum 3.44% 3.80%
1st quartile 3.59% 5.68%
Median 3.65% 6.19%
3rd quartile 3.85% 9.10%
Maximum 4.85% 12.21%
Within interquartile range no yes
Source: Authors, based on data from Amadeus database (by Bureau van Dijk).
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Based on the results of the benchmark, we consider the suspicion that Amazon may be
shifting profits from the Czech Republic via Amazon CZ to be confirmed. However, Ama-
zon’s tendency to do so may not be very high based on the relatively small difference (0.62%)
between the EBIT margin of Amazon CZ (2.82%) and the minimum arm’s length value
(3.44%); we denote it as medium tendency. We point out that should a less restrictive
approach be used to eliminate extreme values from the final sample (e.g., 1st and 9th decile
range instead of an interquartile range), the EBIT margin of Amazon CZ would fall within the
arm’s length range.
As for Uber CZ, our suspicion regarding possible profit shifting by Uber from the Czech
Republic via Uber CZ has not been confirmed; the EBIT margin of Uber CZ (7.91%) is well in
line with its peers. We therefore conclude that Uber exhibits a low tendency to shift profits from
the Czech Republic. Our conclusion is further supported by the fact that TER implies only a
limited global profit-shifting tendency to begin with.
All interim results of our case studies are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6. Summary of interim results
Amazon Apple Avast Google Uber
a) TER calculation
Average TER 0.68 0.81 0.29 0.91 0.55
TER >0.5 yes Yes No yes yes
Further analysis yes noa No yes yes
b) TOL, TOP calculation
Czech member Amazon Logistic
Prague s.r.o.






Yes – – No Yes
c) TNMM benchmark
EBIT margin of Czech
member
2.82% – – – 7.91%
Interquartile range 3.44–4.85% – – – 3.80–12.21%
Within interquartile
range




High High Low High Medium
Profit shifting
tendency – CZ
Medium Low Low Low Low
Source: Authors, data compiled from Tables 1–6.
aCzech member not available.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of the paper was to identify the tendencies of selected MNEs to engage in BEPS using
the TER indicator. As we are not aware of the TER method being applied in practice yet, we
wanted to test its suitability for BEPS indication on a sample of selected MNEs using the case
study method.
After testing the TER method on real world data, we arrive at the conclusion that it might
serve as an efficient tool for preliminary indication of MNEs potential tendencies to engage in
BEPS via transfer mispricing. However, to achieve more reliable results, TER needs to be
interpreted in a broader economic context and supplemented by other methods.
Our results also suggest that the tendency to use transfer mispricing for shifting taxable
profit might be correlated with the size and the form of ownership of MNEs. However, this
conclusion cannot be drawn solely based on our case studies and requires further research.
We have identified several limitations that need to be considered when using the TER
method. First, it is not clear how to interpret non-extreme values of TER (i.e., values that are not
close to 0 or 1); we therefore established our own criteria for interpretation of such non-extreme
values. For further development of the TER method, possible common interpretation rules
should be researched. Second, our assumptions about the profit shifting behavior of MNEs
(represented by the upper and lower boundaries lb and ub and parameter a) are not based on
empirical evidence. Thus, our assumptions might not properly reflect the economic reality of
BEPS. Third, the tax system is described by one parameter only – the tax rate – despite the fact
that MNEs are known to consider other parameters of tax systems as well when choosing
whether and how to engage in BEPS. Additional characteristics of tax systems should be
analyzed to further increase the predictive power of the TER the method. Lastly, the Amadeus
dataset used for our analysis has several natural limitations. Since Amadeus only contains data
on European entities, it is not suitable to assess BEPS tendencies on a truly global scale.
Furthermore, the dataset only contains information on accounting P/L before rather than the
actual tax base while in reality these two values can differ significantly. These limitations of the
Amadeus dataset can be addressed for example by using Orbis datasets with worldwide
coverage, or using data from country by country reports (CbCR) containing information on
actual tax bases of MNEs.
The limitations also apply to TNNM; EBIT margin used as the profit level indicator might be
affected by influences other than BEPS. The predictive power of TNNM can be further limited
by using a suboptimal search strategy. Nevertheless, TNNM is a generally accepted method for
transfer pricing benchmarks. Its undeniable advantage lies in its data availability as well as its
applicability across different economic sectors.
Tax authorities might benefit the most from the application of the TER method. Since the
application of the TER method can be fully automatized, it could be used for the preliminary
indication of BEPS risks in MNEs across the board and for subsequent targeting of tax audits
with only initial administrative (programming) costs. Furthermore, tax authorities have suitable
non-public datasets at their disposal (e.g., CbCR data and data derived from the international
exchange of tax information) which should increase the predictive power of the results. How-
ever, the above-mentioned limitations of the TER method must be considered and the results
need to be interpreted carefully.
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